Docket

SG-A — An Amendment Adjusting the Presidential Line of Succession

Founding anchor: Under the Constitution of 1787 the runner-up in the electoral vote became Vice President, so succession could cross party lines, as it would have in 1797 had John Adams left office and Thomas Jefferson succeeded him. The Twelfth Amendment (1804) ended that by pairing the two offices on one ticket. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment (1967) settled succession and disability. Federalist No. 10 and Washington’s Farewell Address both warn that the spirit of party can bend institutions toward factional advantage.

Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or their resignation, the highest ranking elected federal officer who is not affiliated with the same political party as that President shall become President. In the case that the outgoing President is not affiliated with a political party, the highest ranking elected federal officer who is affiliated with any party shall become President.

Section 2. If there is no elected federal officer of a different party affiliation anywhere in the Executive or Legislative branch, or in the case of the death of the President, the Vice President shall become President.

Section 3. The remainder of the Presidential Line of Succession as laid out in the 25th Amendment shall be unchanged.

Section 4. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Why it matters today: Three presidents have faced impeachment proceedings since 1974, and in each case removal would have handed the office to the President’s own Vice President. The proposal asks whether removal should carry a political cost for the President’s party, and whether that cost would deter misconduct or invite partisan removals.

SG-B — An Amendment Providing an Additional Method of Amendment

Founding anchor: Article V lets Congress or a convention called by two-thirds of the states propose amendments, yet no such convention has ever been called and the people have no direct role in proposing. Jefferson wrote to Madison on September 6, 1789, that “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living” and that every generation should be free to revisit its laws; Madison replied that stability had value too. Indiana’s 1816 Constitution required a vote every twelfth year on whether to call a convention, a device several states still use.

Section 1. At the general election held in every twentieth year after the ratification of this article, the question “Shall there be a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the United States?” shall be submitted to the voters of the several States. If a majority of the votes cast on the question, and majorities of the votes cast in at least half of the States, favor a convention, Congress shall call one within one year.

Section 2. Such a convention shall consist of delegates elected by the people of each State, equal in number to that State’s Senators and Representatives, and may propose amendments by a two-thirds vote of the delegates present.

Section 3. Amendments so proposed shall become valid when ratified as provided in Article V.

Section 4. Nothing in this article shall limit the methods of proposal or ratification set forth in Article V.

Why it matters today: The Constitution has not been amended since 1992, and the last amendment drafted in living memory dates to 1971. Fourteen states put a convention question to voters automatically; the federal Constitution never does. Supporters see a safety valve for a document many citizens regard as frozen; critics see a standing invitation to a runaway convention with no rules.

PA-A — An Amendment Requiring Congressional Authorization for Sustained Use of Military Force

Founding anchor: On August 17, 1787, the Convention changed Congress’s power from “make war” to “declare war,” leaving the executive, in Madison’s words, “the power to repel sudden attacks.” Hamilton in Federalist No. 69 called the commander-in-chief power “much inferior” to a king’s. Writing as Helvidius in 1793, Madison warned that the executive is “the department of power most distinguished by its propensity to war.” The War Powers Resolution (1973) set a sixty-day clock that presidents of both parties have treated as advisory.

Section 1. The power to declare war and to authorize the use of military force by the United States is vested in Congress.

Section 2. The President may direct the armed forces to repel sudden attacks upon the United States, its armed forces, or its territories, and to protect and evacuate citizens of the United States, without prior authorization; but any such use of force shall cease within sixty days unless Congress has authorized its continuation by law.

Section 3. No treaty or appropriation shall be construed as authorization under this article unless it specifically so provides.

Section 4. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Why it matters today: Congress last declared war in 1942, while presidents have since committed forces in Korea, Vietnam, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere under expansive readings of Article II or of old authorizations; the 2001 authorization for force has been cited for operations on several continents.

PA-B — An Amendment Granting the President a Line-Item Veto over Appropriations

Founding anchor: The Convention rejected an absolute veto and a Council of Revision in favor of the qualified veto of Article I, Section 7, which Hamilton in Federalist No. 73 defended as a shield against “improper laws.” The Presentment Clause requires the President to accept or reject a bill whole. Presidents Grant, Reagan, and Clinton all asked for a line-item veto; Congress granted one by statute in 1996, and the Supreme Court struck it down in Clinton v. City of New York (1998).

Section 1. The President may, upon signing any bill making appropriations, disapprove any item of appropriation therein. The items so disapproved shall not take effect, and the remainder of the bill shall become law.

Section 2. The President shall transmit to Congress a statement of each item disapproved and the reasons therefor. Each such item shall be reconsidered by Congress in the manner prescribed for bills returned by the President, and shall become law if approved by two-thirds of each House.

Section 3. This article shall not apply to appropriations for the compensation of Members of Congress or of the judges of the United States, or for the operations of the Congress or the courts.

Section 4. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Why it matters today: Most governors, though not Indiana’s, hold some form of line-item veto. Federal spending bills now run to thousands of pages and are often passed in a single omnibus days before a deadline, which makes the whole-bill veto nearly unusable. The question is whether trimming items would discipline spending or hand the executive a new lever over every legislator’s district.

R-A — An Amendment Securing a Right to Public Education

Founding anchor: The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 declared that “schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged,” and Article IX of Indiana’s 1816 Constitution directed the legislature to build a system “from township schools to a state university, wherein tuition shall be gratis, and equally open to all.” The federal Constitution is silent on education. In San Antonio v. Rodriguez (1973) the Supreme Court held that it guarantees no such right, leaving the matter to the states, all fifty of whose constitutions contain an education clause.

Section 1. Every person shall have the right to a free public education from kindergarten through the twelfth grade, adequate to prepare them for civic participation and for work.

Section 2. The States shall establish and maintain systems of public schools open equally to all. Congress may assist the States in fulfilling this duty.

Section 3. Nothing in this article shall be construed to authorize any court to levy a tax or to direct the content of instruction.

Section 4. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Why it matters today: Reading and math scores have fallen since 2019, and school funding still varies widely between districts. State courts have spent fifty years on adequacy suits; Indiana’s Supreme Court held in Bonner v. Daniels (2009) that the state’s education clause imposes a duty on the legislature but no right a court can enforce.

R-B — An Amendment Extending Freedom of Speech to Digital Public Forums

Founding anchor: The First Amendment restrains government, not private companies, a line the Supreme Court drew in the Civil Rights Cases (1883). Yet the founding generation built a public forum of its own: the Post Office Act of 1792 guaranteed newspapers cheap carriage and forbade the government to open the mail. Marsh v. Alabama (1946) applied the First Amendment to a company town; Packingham v. North Carolina (2017) called social media “the modern public square”; and Moody v. NetChoice (2024) held that a platform’s content choices are themselves protected speech.

Section 1. The freedom of speech shall extend to communication upon any digital platform that Congress shall by law designate as a public forum by reason of its size and its openness to the public, and no such platform shall exclude or suppress the lawful speech of any person on account of the viewpoint expressed.

Section 2. Nothing in this article shall prevent a platform from removing speech that is unlawful, or from applying rules that are viewpoint-neutral, published in advance, and applied equally to all users; nor shall it abridge the freedom of any platform to publish its own speech.

Section 3. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Why it matters today: A handful of platforms now carry most public debate, and both parties have accused them of silencing views, though not the same views. Texas and Florida passed laws restricting viewpoint-based removal; the Supreme Court sent them back for reconsideration without settling the question.